2. The Mexican bailout did not produce an Asian lending boom. Post-peso-crisis, portfolio flows to all of the emerging markets skidded to $23.8 billion in 1995, from more than $60 billion in 1993, before rising to $33.2 billion in 1996, then dipping below $20 billion last year. Bank lending and securitized flows to Asia did not fall as sharply and rose as a percentage of total flows because the region was perceived to be far more creditworthy.

And despite all the chatter about wildly reckless lending, some evidence of caution exists. Short-term credits grew in proportion to total debt as savvier banks grew wary. Says John Lipsky, chief economist and head of research at Chase Manhattan Bank and a former IMF economist: "That's why they were unwilling to lend long term."

3. IMF actions don't prevent losses. The U.S. and the IMF prevented default by the Mexican government on its $16 billion in tesebonos, dollar-linked securities, but an estimated $40 billion in investments was wiped out.



There's more involved here than just loans; these days few institutions are pure lenders. Asian-related problems tagged J.P. Morgan with a $600 million (and counting) loan-loss provision, while heavy losses in emerging-markets trading sent SBC Warburg Dillon Read's earnings plunging to Sf20 million ($13.4 million) in the second half last year, from Sf691 million in the first half of the year. And U.S. mutual funds may have lost about $50 billion on their holdings of Latin American and Asian securities in last fall's market tumble, estimates David Hale, Zurich Group's chief international economist.

"Any institution that marks to market suffered," notes Merrill Lynch & Co.'s chairman of global financial institutions, John Heimann, a former head of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Agrees New York Federal Reserve president William McDonough: "The banks did not come out of this unscathed."

4. Governments don't view IMF bailouts as pain-free. IMF "conditionality" — the terms it sets in return for its money — are often harsh, sometimes counterproductively so. Loan rates can be high; penalties are stiff. Most countries will do almost anything to avoid turning to the Fund.

Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand have suffered immensely from their crises. Most of their banks have been wiped out. The Thai government fell, the ruling party in South Korea was toppled (and the business establishment is under siege), and the Suharto family and friends in Indonesia are feeling the heat. Argues Fischer: "No country would deliberately court such a crisis, even if it thought international assistance would be forthcoming. The economic, financial, social and political pain is simply too great. Nor do countries show any great desire to enter IMF programs unless they absolutely have to."

5. The IMF lacks enforcement powers. The Fund's terms don't carry the weight of law. The Fund cannot force a country into a bankruptcy court or seize assets. And even countries on the dole resist reforms. "Money talks, but the IMF still can't force a country to do anything," says James Lee Hudson, a partner at San Francisco investment boutique Hudson & Hudson. That makes it a gamble, not a guarantee, for even the most sophisticated investors to handicap IMF bailouts. Soros Fund Management chief portfolio manager Stanley Druckenmiller bet that the Indonesian rupiah would strengthen after the IMF announced stabilization steps in October, only to lose big-time when the currency plunged (*Institutional Investor*, March 1998).

6. Asian governments, not the IMF, encouraged reckless behavior. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist and emerging-markets scold Paul Krugman lays much of the blame on a combination of implicit and explicit guarantees by Asian governments to their banking systems. These, coupled with the coziness of business elites and government officials that stands at the heart of the so-called Asian model, led

contact Hudson&Hudson (2020)
for financing consultation and fiscal problem-solving: 1-858-754-8703